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1 Introduction
According to one traditional conception, knowledge is always a passive or re-
ceptive state that reflects the way things are in the mind-independent world.1
Against this assumption, Elizabeth Anscombe argues in Intention that (what I
will call) agential knowledge, or a person's knowledge of what she is intentionally
doing, breaks this mold: agential knowledge is always practical rather than
speculative knowledge, insofar as it is somehow the cause of what it under-
stands (Anscombe 1963a, 57, 87-89).2 In this Anscombe follows St. Thomas
Aquinas, who in turn follows Aristotle, who writes in De Anima III.10 that νοῦς
can be among the sources of human movement: thought, that is, which calcu-
lates means to an end, i.e. practical thought (it differs from speculative thought
in the character of its end) (433a14-15).3 One way to read the second half or so
∗This paper derives from one I presented at a workshop on Practical Knowledge and Practi-
cal Wisdom, held in June, 2012 at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. I am grateful
to the Lumen Christi Institute for sponsoring the workshop, and to Jennifer Frey for her
excellent work in organizing it. I also presented a much earlier version of this material at
the 2010 meeting of the North Carolina Philosophical Society, and a more recent version at
the 2014 meeting of the Society for Catholicism and Analytic Philosophy. I am grateful to
Samuel Baker, Stephen Brock, Phil Clark, Christopher Frey, Kim Frost, Matthias Haase, John
O'Callaghan, Daniel Rockowitz, Sebastian Rödl, and Joshua Stuchlik for helpful discussion
of these issues, and especially to Randy Clarke, Jennifer Frey, Eric Marcus, Beri Maru²i¢,
Al Mele, Anselm Müller, Philip Reed, Kieran Setiya, Will Small, Nathanael Stein, Niels Van
Miltenburg, and two anonymous referees with this journal for comments on earlier drafts of
the paper. Thanks also to the students in my Spring 2011 Doing and Knowing course at
Mount St. Mary's and my Fall 2013 Epistemology and Metaphysics of Action seminar at
Florida State, and to the Provost's office at Mount St. Mary's University for supporting this
research with a Faculty Development Grant.
1As is usually the case with assumptions, this conception is taken for granted much more
often than it is explicitly stated. But it is revealed clearly enough in the epistemologists'
standard lists of sources of knowledge (perception, reason, introspection, memory, testimony,
etc.) and things we can thereby know (that this is a barn; that Jones owns a Ford; that
2+2=4; and so on). It is, though, usually acknowledged that practical know-how may not
fit this standard; on its relevance to my inquiry, see footnote 9 below. For critical diagnosis
of a similar assumption in philosophical work on consciousness, see Hurley 1998.
2Hereafter, Intention will be cited simply as `I ', followed by page numbers.
3Compare Nicomachean Ethics VI.2: Intellect itself . . . moves nothing, but only the
intellect which aims at an end and is practical (1139a35-b1). For some more of Aquinas'
sources, see Section 3 below.
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of Anscombe's Intention is as an extended attempt to show how this concept of
practical knowledge is the key to understanding intentional action itself, thereby
shining some light into the utter darkness in which we [find] ourselves when
we regard a person's knowledge of her actions as a strictly speculative affair
(I, 57).
However, despite its centrality to Anscombe's project, her concept of prac-
tical knowledge has not been widely understood.4 Part of the blame for this
lies with Anscombe herself: she is anything but systematic, and she appeals
to the concept of practical knowledge with a bewildering array of formulations,
several of which it is hard to see as connected to the others.5 A second ex-
planation is that recent attempts to unpack Anscombe's conception of agential
knowledge have usually preceded without much attention to the Aristotelian
and Thomistic texts whose ideas she is frequently incorporating  a lack I hope
to remedy in this paper by relating Anscombe's views to Aquinas' discussion
of practical cognition in the Summa Theologiae.6 But a final reason for this
lack of understanding is the tendency among many of Anscombe's interlocutors
to focus just on her better-known claim that a person always knows without
observation whatever he or she is intentionally doing (I, 13), without doing as
much to explore Anscombe's idea that there is something else distinctive about
practical knowledge in contrast to knowledge that is derived from the objects
known (ibid., 87).7 This is important, because the former doctrine is widely
4For example, at the end of a generally sympathetic discussion of Anscombe's critique
of causal theories of action, Stewart Candlish and Nic Damnjanovic write that Anscombe's
account of `practical knowledge' is hard to interpret . . . and so it is difficult to see the
alternative to either interior acts of intention or causalism that she has in mind (Candlish and
Damnjanovic 2013, 700-701). Less enthusiastically, David Velleman (2007a, 103) complains
that Anscombe's conception of practical knowledge appears not just causally perverse but
epistemically mysterious; however, he softens this assessment somewhat in pp. xxi-xxv of the
preface to the 2007 reprinting of Practical Reflection.
5Thus Anselm Müller (1999) identifies six different ways that agent's knowledge is char-
acterized in Intention: (1) it is knowledge without observation; (2) it is knowledge that
measures its object, rather than being measured by it; (3) it is knowledge that is the outcome
of practical reasoning; (4) it involves the knowledge of how to do certain things; (5) it is
knowledge that is contradicted by being thwarted; and (6) it is knowledge that is a constitu-
tive component of action. The account I offer below has the virtue of unifying most of these
characterizations, though I have little to say about practical know-how, and ultimately I reject
(with important caveats; see Section 5 below) Anscombe's conception of practical knowledge
as necessarily non-observational.
6For a more thorough study of Aquinas' conception of the practical intellect, see Naus 1959.
Aquinas' views are also discussed by Peter Geach (1972, 324-327), Anthony Kenny (1979, 34-
37), and (in a rather different context) Linda Zagzebski (1991, 57-59, 88-91). Thanks to Daniel
Rockowitz for this last reference.
7I don't think it should be controversial to say that this is a common way of explor-
ing Anscombe's views. For example, Falvey 2000, Pickard 2004, and Paul 2009a all de-
velop Anscombean positions that focus exclusively on the idea that agent's knowledge is
non-observational, and say little or nothing about what makes this knowledge distinctively
practical. For work that cuts against this tendency to varying degrees, see Velleman 2007a;
O'Brien 2003, 2007; Roessler 2003; Moran 2004; Newstead 2006, 2009; Rödl 2007; Rödl 2011;
Setiya 2007, 2008; Grünbaum 2009, 2011; Haddock 2010, 2011; McDowell 2011, 2013; Thomp-
son 2011; Marcus 2012; Small 2012; Kern and Horst 2013; Ford 2013; Lavin 2013b; Horst
2013. However, for most of these authors the characterization of agent's knowledge as non-
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regarded as problematic, and an exclusive focus on it can bar us from consider-
ing what else might be right in Anscombe's view.8 Together with the seeming
inevitability of what Anscombe calls the incorrigibly contemplative conception
of knowledge that she takes to be characteristic of modern thought (ibid., 57),
all this makes the concept of practical knowledge seem an unlikely place to found
a theory of action.9
However understandable, this situation makes it very difficult for Anscombe's
readers to be confident that we have gotten her view right, and thus to evaluate
its philosophical promise. This is especially true if, as I suggested above, the
claim that agential knowledge is practical knowledge is doing more philosophical
work in Intention than the claim that it is knowledge without observation. As
several commentators have noted,10 in the argument of Intention the concept of
non-observational knowledge appears early in the text, when Anscombe is offer-
ing a preliminary characterization of which actions fall under the certain sense
of the question `Why? ' that she takes to have application only to intentional
actions (I, 9). This characterization of agential knowledge is purely negative
 it tells us that it is not knowledge through observation, and Anscombe sup-
plies several examples, including that of our way of knowing the positions of
our limbs, to help us understand it. But of course agential knowledge is not
precisely the same sort of knowledge as the knowledge of one's bodily position,
even if they share some features in common.11 Moreover, Anscombe herself is
aware of many of the difficulties that arise when we try to understand agential
knowledge as non-observational: indeed, she raises them herself in 28-30 of
Intention and considers what she regards as several insufficient responses to
them, before moving in 31 to considerations that build toward proposing the
concept of practical knowledge as the key element in a better solution. If we take
Anscombe's concept of non-observational knowledge for granted without under-
observational remains primary, and comparatively less is said about the practical/speculative
distinction. I survey much of this literature in Schwenkler 2012.
8Perhaps the most influential criticism of the claim that intentional action requires non-
observational knowledge of what one is doing has been Donald Davidson's example of a man
intentionally making a stack of legible carbon copies without knowing that he is doing this
(Davidson 1980, 50). For other early criticisms see Donnellan 1963 and the papers cited in
Velleman 2007a, 19n. Of the authors cited in the note above who address this question,
only Horst, Marcus, Newstead, Rödl, Thompson, and Small defend an unqualified version of
this doctrine; all the others hold that the domain of non-observational agent's knowledge is
restricted in some way.
9There has, of course, been a lot of recent discussion of the concept of practical know-how,
and whether it is reducible to propositional knowledge-that. However, while the concept of
know-how is certainly relevant to Anscombe's theory of action (see e.g. I, 88; and cf. Müller
1999; Hornsby 2005; Setiya 2008; Rödl 2011), agential knowledge is not simply a kind of
know-how, but rather a first-personal way of knowing what is happening when one exercises
the practical capacity to do a certain thing.
10See e.g. Hursthouse 2000; Moran 2004; McDowell 2011.
11For some resistance to this idea, see McDowell 2011, who argues that bodily self-knowledge
is rendered non-observational partly through its ties to agency. However, McDowell does not
believe that the knowledge of one's bodily position provides a sufficient model for understand-
ing agential knowledge, since as he admits (ibid., 142), bodily self-knowledge is not the cause
of what it understands.
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standing what is supposed to make this knowledge practical, then our grasp of
her position is bound to be very partial, and focused on considerations that in
her view were really quite secondary. Yet as I noted above, this is exactly what
many of her recent interlocutors have tended to do.
Against this tendency, my aim in this paper is to make a case for the cen-
trality of the concept of practical knowledge to the proper understanding of
intentional agency, separating this concept from the more common conception
of agent's knowledge as knowledge that is independent of perception. To do
this, I will address two main questions:
First, in what sense is agential knowledge practical knowledge, or
knowledge that causes what it represents?
Second, does the fact that agential knowledge is practical in this
manner guarantee that a person must always know without obser-
vation whatever she is intentionally doing?
I address the first question in Sections 2 and 3, proceeding as follows:
 Section 2 begins with the idea, proposed recently by several different
philosophers, that agential knowledge is practical insofar as it is the
formal cause of its object, or the principle that unifies an action into an
order of means and ends. I start by developing this idea and distinguishing
it from the more familiar conception of practical thought as an efficient
cause of bodily motion (2.1), then argue that the account needs further
development, as more must said about how the material elements of a
person's intentional activity relate to her knowledge of what she is doing
(2.2). This latter point sets the stage for the argument of the following
section.
 Section 3 adds what I think is missing to the initial account of agential
knowledge as the source of an action's means-end unity, drawing on a
reading of Thomas Aquinas' discussion of practical cognition in the Summa
Theologiae. Aquinas' understanding of practical knowledge, which I argue
on textual grounds is plausibly attributed to Anscombe as well, centers
on the idea that knowledge is practical insofar as it aims at production,
and its object is something the agent has the power to effect. I go on to
argue that agential knowledge has this characteristic because of its role in
the process of agential self-guidance, by which an agent ensures that she
is acting as she means to, and bringing about her desired ends.
In light of this argument, I turn in Sections 4 and 5 to address the second ques-
tion, exploring how the practical character of agential knowledge relates to the
idea that a person must know without observation whatever she is intentionally
doing:
 Section 4 begins with an important contrast between the practical thought
of an infinite agent, such as God, and that of a finite human being, namely
that whereas God's knowledge is the principle of a creative act that does
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not depend on preexisting matter for its reality, human action always in-
volves reshaping what is already given in the material world. In light of
this contrast, I argue that it is possible for a human agent to be mistaken
about what she is intentionally doing (4.1), to do something intention-
ally without knowing that she is doing this (4.2), or for such a person's
knowledge of what she is intentionally doing to be grounded in perception
(4.3).
 Finally, Section 5 argues that even when it is grounded in perception,
still the knowledge of what one is intentionally doing may count as non-
observational in one important sense, namely insofar as observational
knowledge is exclusively passive or receptive, whereas an agent's perceptually-
grounded knowledge of her action still plays an active role in causing what
it represents.
That is, on the account I develop here the practical knowledge of what one is
intentionally doing is distinguished from speculative forms of knowledge not
by its independence from perception, but rather by the role it plays in bringing
its object into existence.
2 The Form of an Action12
In this section, I explore the idea that a person's knowledge of what she is doing
is the formal cause of its object, or that in virtue of which a person's movements
and their effects constitute a unity of means and ends.13 This terminology is
deliberately Aristotelian: it appeals to the intuition that the material elements
of a person's behavior  the fact that one's body is moving about in certain
ways, and causing certain things to happen in the world  don't on their own
amount to an action, any more than the material properties of some sounds
or marks are enough to make them a unit of meaning. Taken on its own, this
latter idea is common to all analytic philosophers of action, but part of what
makes Anscombe's position distinctive is that in her view, what distinguishes an
action is most fundamentally a matter of how intentional activity is understood
by the one who acts. I motivate and develop this position in 2.1, then argue
in 2.2 that this conception of agential knowledge as formal cause needs to
be supplemented by an account of how this knowledge affects the material
aspects of a person's intentional activity.
12Many thanks to Jen Frey, Eric Marcus, Kieran Setiya, and an anonymous referee for lots
of helpful discussion of the ideas I explore in this section.
13For talk of formal causality in connection with Anscombe's conception of practical knowl-
edge, see Hursthouse 2000; Moran 2004; Newstead 2006, 2009; Stoutland 2011a,b. Other im-
portant work that develops Anscombe's position along these lines is in Thompson 2008; Rödl
2007; Rödl 2011; Ford 2011; Marcus 2012; Lavin 2013b; Frey forthcoming. One question I
won't be able to consider here is how the account of agential knowledge as a formal cause of
its object relates to the concept of final causality in intentional action. Thanks to Nat Stein
and an anonymous referee for making me mindful of this connection.
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2.1 Thought and action
Consider Vashti, whose present behavior can be described in many different
ways. She is moving her hand downward. She is striking an egg against the
side of a bowl with the force necessary to crack it. She is making a soué.
And she is preparing breakfast for her daughter. Let us suppose that Vashti is
doing all these things intentionally. What, if anything, is distinctively agential
about Vashti's knowledge that she is moving her hand, cracking an egg, and so
forth? What makes this knowledge different from any other person's knowledge
of what Vashti is up to, and also from the knowledge Vashti might have of things
she is doing without intending to do them? In virtue of what might Vashti's
knowledge of what she is intentionally doing be a kind of practical knowledge?
Anscombe's answer begins with the concept of practical reasoning, as in her
view understanding this is a necessary first step toward understanding practical
knowledge in general (see I, 57). For Anscombe, practical reasoning is a form of
thought that proceeds from a general action-type to a particular bodily move-
ment by identifying means to a given end:14 for example, to move one's hand
in such a way in order to crack an egg in order to make a soué in order to
provide breakfast for one's child in order to feed her. She insists, however, that
this talk of practical reasoning should not be read as identifying an interior
mental process from which bodily movement results: instead, an agent's prac-
tical thinking is the ground of a rational order inherent in intentional activity
itself, something that informs purposive activity throughout the time a per-
son is engaged in it.15 According to Anscombe, the Aristotelian concept of a
practical syllogism is just a formal way of making explicit what is less formally
represented by the answers a person might give to a series of questions asking
for the reasons for her action, under various descriptions of it. Thus suppose we
begin to query Vashti:
Why are you moving your hand in that way?
To crack an egg.
And why are you cracking the egg?
To make a soué.
And why are you making a soué?
It's for my daughter's breakfast.
In these responses, Vashti reveals that these four descriptions of what she is do-
ing  moving her hand, cracking an egg, making a soué, and preparing break-
14Thanks to Jen Frey for this formulation. For more on Anscombe's conception of practical
reasoning as a form of means-end calculation, see Müller 1979; Vogler 2001, 2002; Ford 2013;
Frey forthcoming.
15On this point see I, 79-80. This is not to deny that (conscious or  more likely  uncon-
scious) practical reasoning may sometimes precede an action and give rise to it; here see the
discussion in 27 of Intention of the possible moral relevance of interior acts of intention.
Anscombe's point is just that no such thing is necessary for an action to be intentional, or to
be a way of realizing an end through certain means. She may be wrong about this, but it's
hard to say this confidently without first understanding the alternative she is proposing. For
much more on this subject, see Frey (forthcoming), which has had a major influence on my
argument here.
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fast for her daughter  constitute a sort of logical progression, in which each
description is introduced as dependent on the previous one, though independent
of the following one (ibid., 45). The answers identify the rational structure of
Vashti's intentional activity, relating her actions under these descriptions in a se-
ries of means-end relationships: each of the first three descriptions characterizes
Vashti's activity as a means to something further, while the final one specifies
her (proximate) aim, or what Anscombe calls the intention with which she is
acting as she is (ibid., 46). If what Vashti says is true, she is moving her hand
because she is cracking an egg, and doing this because she is making a soué,
and so on. And all of this will be true not because of anything that went on
in Vashti's mind before she began to act, but rather because of her standing
practical knowledge of what she is doing.16
Yet how is this possible? How can what a person knows about her action
make a difference to what happens in the world?17 Anscombe's answer to this
question rests on her conception of intentional activity as a unity of means and
ends: she holds that nothing can be an action unless it is the sort of thing to
which the question Why? has application, where this question seeks to draw
out the action's means-end order  an order, she says, which is there whenever
actions are done with intentions (I, 80).18 As we have seen, this order of means
and ends is an explanatory order, and thus an order of causes: that Vashti is
making breakfast is part of what explains why she is moving around as she is.
However, this is a different form of causal relatedness than the one we inquire
after when we ask, say, Why did the tree fall? or Why did the ball roll down
the hill?  though of course such connections of efficient causation are essential
to everything we intentionally do. For when we say in this sense that someone is
X-ing because she is Y-ing, we represent her X-ing not as a result of her Y-ing,
as the fall of a tree may be the effect of its being struck by an axe, but as a
means to it, or something she is doing in order to obtain something further.
And Anscombe holds that nothing in the world as it is independent of practical
reason  nothing in the movement of certain molecules, or even of certain human
bodies  could ground this kind of connection.
We can clearer on this idea by contrasting it with another, probably more
familiar conception of the place of thought in human action, captured nicely in
a passage from Hobbes's Leviathan. Hobbes writes:
16To head off an objection before it arises: It has become fashionable to say, in contexts
such as this one, that this falsifies the `phenomenology' of skillful action. This presupposes
that the presence of knowledge in action would make itself felt in the manner of a sensation.
But knowledge has no `phenomenology'. Descriptions of how it feels to do something one
knows well how to do are irrelevant to our inquiry (Rödl 2011, 227n).
17As Anscombe puts it, in a paper published the same year as the second edition of Inten-
tion: What bearing can what the agent thinks have on the true description of what he does?
Someone may want to say: if what he does is a happening, a physical event, something `in the
external world', then that happening must be something that takes place, whatever the agent
thinks ... If we ask: Why? the answer is: because what the agent thinks simply cannot make
any difference to the truth of a description of a physical fact or event (Anscombe 1963b, 4).
18For a powerful defense of the claim that this kind of means-end structure is essential to
intentional activity in general, see Lavin 2013a.
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There be in Animals, two sorts of Motions peculiar to them: One
called Vitall ; begun in generation, and continued without interrup-
tion through their whole life; such as are the course of the Bloud,
the Pulse, the Breathing, the Concoction, Nutrition, Excretion, &c.;
to which Motion there needs no help of Imagination: The other is
Animall motion, otherwise called Voluntary motion; as to go, to
speak, to move any of our limbes, in such manner as is first fancied
in our minds ... And because going, speaking, and the like Volun-
tary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of whither,
which way, and what ; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first
internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion. (Bk. I, ch. vi19)
For Hobbes, thought is the cause of action insofar as what happens inside of a
person is the internall beginning of her body's movements: there are, he writes,
small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in
walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, [and which] are commonly
called Endeavour (ibid.). As a result of these internal motions, human beings
move around the world in many complex ways. Change the internal motions,
and our outer movements change as a result; silence the mind altogether, and
only our vital functions remain.
By contrast, at the core of Anscombe's account of action is the idea that
practical thought is not an efficient cause that sets the visible parts of our
body into motion, but the formal principle that unifies an action, or that in
virtue of which certain physical happenings are constituted as parts of a person's
intentional activity. As she writes, when we are interested in human actions:
It is not that we have a special interest in the movement of these
moleculesnamely, the ones in a human being; or even in the move-
ment of certain bodiesnamely human ones. The description of what
we are interested in is a type of description that would not exist if
our question `Why?' did not. It is not that certain things, namely
the movements of humans, are for some undiscovered reason subject
to the question `Why?' So too, it is not just that certain appear-
ances of chalk on a blackboard are subject to the question `What
does it say?' It is of a word or sentence that we ask `What does
it say?'; and the description of something as a word or sentence at
all could not occur prior to the fact that words or sentences have
meaning. So the description of something as a human action could
not occur prior to the existence of the question `Why?', simply as a
kind of utterance by which we were then obscurely prompted to ask
the question. (I, 83)
The analogy with linguistic meaning is instructive. Anscombe's point is that the
question What does it say?, asked of a series of marks on a blackboard, bears
a very different relation to its object than does, say, the question What does it
19I owe the reference to Velleman 2000, 123.
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weigh?, asked of something like a bag of apples: in the latter case, the object of
the inquiry has a unity independent of the question being asked about it, as there
could have been bags of apples even if questions about weight had never occurred
to anyone. But questions of meaning relate to words and sentences differently
than this: the unity of a word or sentence is semantic or propositional, a unity
not of matter but of meaning, and so the it whose significance we query when
we ask What does it say? would not be anything unitary  would not be any
one thing, as opposed to a mere aggregate of sounds or marks  if the form
of thought embodied in this questioning did not exist. And Anscombe argues
that the same is true of human actions: in her view, the unity of an action is
teleological, a unity of not of matter but of means and ends, and so the that
whose purpose we query when we ask Why are you doing that? would not be
anything unitary  would not be any one event, as opposed to a mere collection
of things that happen  if the form of thought embodied in this questioning did
not exist. Like speech and writing, action depends on thought not just because
the complexity of many of our bodily movements could only have arisen through
cognitively sophisticated causes, but also as its unifying principle: in each case,
the unity in question has its source in reason.
To get at the idea in a slightly different way, consider a variant of Wittgen-
stein's famous question from Philosophical Investigations 621: What is left
over if I subtract the fact that I know what I am doing from the fact that I
am doing something intentionally?20 One of Anscombe's great insights is that
facts about one's actions considered simply as bodily movements21 with vari-
ous further effects do not on their own determine what one is doing. In our
example, Vashti is moving her hand because she is cracking an egg, cracking
an egg because she is making a soué, and making a soué because she is
preparing her daughter's breakfast. That Vashti knows she is doing all of this
is not just a further feature of the example that is present in addition to these
happenings, but something without which these things would not be happen-
ing at all: if we subtract from the example Vashti's knowledge of what she is
up to, then what remains will not be enough to determine what, if anything,
she is cooking (someone moving around in just these ways could be making an
omelette instead of a soué, lunch instead of breakfast, etc.), or to relate any
of the remaining mind-independent facts about her movements in an order of
means and ends (Vashti could unknowingly be moving her hand and cracking
an egg, but only due to her practical thought can she be doing the former thing
because she is doing the latter). As Anscombe puts it, such knowledge is not a
mere extra feature of events whose description would otherwise be the same,
20Wittgenstein's original question asked What is left over if I subtract the fact that my
arm goes up from the fact that I raised my arm? As David Velleman notes (2000, 1), solving
this piece of Wittgensteinian arithmetic has been the focus of most analytical work in the
philosophy of action for the past half-century. On the difference that such a starting-point
makes, see Lavin 2013b.
21That is, bodily movements characterized in terms of what Anscombe calls vital descrip-
tions, which represent them simply as movements with a normal role in the sensitive, and
therefore appetitive, life of animals (I, 86), rather than as aspects of a person's intentional
activity.
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since without it what happens does not come under the descriptionexecution
of intentionswhose characteristics we have been investigating (I, 88). In this
way, the knowledge of what one is doing is partly constitutive of action itself,
and so it is causa rerum intellectarum, a cause of the things that are understood.
2.2 Form and matter
Many questions arise at this point. One concerns something about which I
have been deliberately obscure so far, namely whether the cognitive state I
have described sometimes as practical thought, practical reasoning, or a per-
son's understanding of what she is intentionally doing, must always amount to
practical knowledge of its objects. This is an important question, but I propose
to postpone it until Section 4, and until then I will continue to use this looser
terminology. In the present section, my aim is to articulate a different sort of
concern for this account of an agent's practical knowledge as the unifying prin-
ciple or formal cause of her actions. My purpose in raising this concern is not
to argue that we should reject this account, but rather to identify some ways in
which it needs further development  a task I'll then take up in Section 3.
According to the interpretation I proposed in 2.1, a central tenet of Anscombe's
theory of action is the idea that agential knowledge isn't an interior efficient
cause of exterior bodily motion, at least in the way that Hobbes and others try
to develop this idea. In contrast to this conception, Anscombe sees an agent's
practical knowledge as something that informs her intentional activity through-
out its unfolding, and she locates the distinctive causal role of this knowledge in
its status as the principle of an action's means-end unity. But while this under-
standing of practical thought is attractive in a lot of ways, it can seem to say too
little about what we might call the material influence of practical thinking, or
how an agent's understanding of what she is doing makes a difference not just in
whether her movements and their effects fall under certain higher-order descrip-
tions, but also in the structure of these movements themselves. Whereas on an
analysis like Hobbes's, the identification of thought as the internall beginning
of voluntary motion makes it quite clear that practical reasoning is part of the
efficient-causal explanation of why agents (or at least: agents' bodies) move in
the ways they do, there can be a temptation to read Anscombe as denying even
this much, and holding instead that practical thought is the cause of action only
because without there are only certain material happenings that are not them-
selves the execution of an intention, and not at all insofar as agential knowledge
plays any role in the production of various results (I, 87-88).22
To see why this should seem worrisome, consider an objection that Anscombe
raises against herself early on in Intention, concerning her claim that expressions
of intention are a special form of prediction:
I once saw some notes on a lecture of Wittgenstein in which he
imagined some leaves blown about by the wind and saying `Now I'll
22To be clear: I don't think that any of the authors cited in footnote 14 above are interpreting
Anscombe in this way. Thanks to an anonymous referee for presssing me to clarify this.
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go this way ... now I'll go that way' as the wind blew them. The
analogy is unsatisfactory in apparently assigning no role to these
predictions other than that of an unnecessary accompaniment to
the movements of the leaves. But it might be replied: what do you
mean by an `unnecessary' accompaniment? If you mean one in the
absence of which the movements of the leaves would have been just
the same, the analogy is certainly bad. (I, 6-7)
In the present case, while I have argued that for Anscombe the knowledge of
what one is doing is certainly not an unnecessary component of a person's inten-
tional activity, since without this knowledge there is no such activity to speak of,
the difficulty remains that describing agential knowledge only as what supplies
the form that unifies a person's movements and their effects into a means-end
order can give the impression that without this knowledge those movements
themselves could be exactly the same, at least under many of their purely ma-
terial descriptions. It is as if one were to say in connection with Wittgenstein's
example that if we were to subtract from it the leaves' knowledge of where they
are going, they could not be moving around intentionally, as their movements
could not embody a means-end unity: this may be true, but it doesn't address
the concern that the leaves' thoughts about their movements are idle thoughts,
precisely because they are materially inert. In order for the leaves to be agents,
and for their knowledge of their movements to be the kind of knowledge a person
has of what she is intentionally doing, it cannot be just a lucky accident that the
leaves' movements correspond to their thoughts about them: instead, an agent's
intentional movements must be guided or controlled by her practical thinking,
and not just a matter of how she is blown about by the wind.23 Absent such
an influence, the mere fact that the leaves might think of their movements as
embodying a certain means-end order won't be enough for them to have any
such characteristics. Because of this, to explain what makes agential knowledge
practical it is not enough just to say that this knowledge is what gives the de-
scriptions under which what is going on is the execution of an intention (ibid.,
87)  or rather, we seem not to have explained how our movements ever could
be so described, until we explain how the knowledge of what one is intentionally
doing makes a difference to the character of those movements themselves, and is
therefore a knowledge of oneself as an agent, and not a merely passive subject
of motion.
I should emphasize again that my purpose in raising this concern is not
23David Horst makes a related point in a recent paper, writing that one who has first-
personal, practical knowledge of what he is doing must know dass die Handlung, die er so
vorstellt, unter seiner Kontrolle ist, insofern sie die Wirkung ebendieser Vorstellung ist.
In having practical knowledge of what I am doing, weiß ich auch um den kausalen Nexus,
der mein Denken und mein Handeln verknüpft, und kraft dessen es kein Zufall ist, dass ich
tue, was ich denke (Horst 2013, 378-379). Similarly, Horst and Andrea Kern write that the
distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge bezeichnet nicht einen Unterschied
zwischen Intalten des Gewussten, sondern einen Underschied in der Form der Beziehung zum
Inhalt des Wissens (Kern and Horst 2013, 353). They continue: Während theoretisches
Wissen demnach in einem passiven Verhältnis zu seinem Gegenstand steht, steht praktisches
Wissen in einem produktiven Verhältnis zu seinem Gegenstand (ibid., 354).
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to challenge the claim that agential knowledge should be understood as the
formal cause of its object in the way proposed above, but only to show what
is required to develop this idea adequately. My point is just that the account
needs something more than I have offered so far, if it is to show how an agent's
knowledge of what she is intentionally doing is not a purely formal feature in
virtue of which her actions fall under certain descriptions, but also something
with a material influence in the way those very actions unfold.24 We need to
say more about what makes a cognitive act practical as opposed to speculative,
such that it is a distinctively agential manner of knowing (or, perhaps, something
less than knowing) that is suited to supply the intentional form to the matter
of one's bodily movements and their effects. I argue in the following section that
just such an account can be found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, and that
there is good textual basis for thinking that these ideas are in the background
of Anscombe's position in Intention.
3 Practical Knowledge
Can it be, Anscombe asks, that there is something that modern philosophy
has blankly misunderstood: namely what ancient and medieval philosophers
meant by practical knowledge? (I, 57). She goes on to suggest that this mis-
understanding, and the incorrigibly contemplative conception of knowledge it
underwrites, is the explanation of the utter darkness in which we found our-
selves in trying to understand how what is known in intention could be one
and the same object that can also be observationally known: namely, a bodily
movement that is at once a happening in the material world and the execution
of an agent's intention.
Yet as I have noted, while Anscombe is clear that retrieval of the ancient
conception of practical knowledge is essential to finding our way out of this
darkness, she is far less clear about what that conception is. My argument in
Section 2 was a first step toward filling this gap, as I argued that the role of
agential knowledge as the unifying principle of a person's intentional activity
gives this knowledge the standing of an Aristotelian formal cause: much as
the form of a living organism is what constitutes its proper parts into compo-
nents of a single substance, so the knowledge of what one is doing unifies her
24For a related point, compare Richard Moran's discussion of the concept of conscious be-
lief in Authority and Estrangement : he writes that to call something a conscious belief says
something about the character of the belief in question ... a conscious belief enters into differ-
ent relations with the rest of one's mental economy and thereby alters its character. We speak
of the `consciousness' in `conscious belief' as something that informs and qualifies the belief in
question, and not just as specifying a theoretical relation in which I stand to this mental state
... We apply the term `conscious' to the belief itself for reasons related to why we apply this
term to certain activities of the person, where this qualifies the activity in ways that do not
obtain with respect to someone else's awareness of it ... so that, for instance, sleepwalking,
walking normally and unreflectively, and walking with conscious deliberateness are all distinct
kinds of activity. In this last case, the person's consciousness of his activity is not something
that stands outside it observing, but infuses and informs it, making a describable difference
in the kind of activity it is (Moran 2001, 30-31).
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movements and their effects into a single activity that embodies a means-end
order. However, I then argued that on its own this account can make agential
knowledge appear curiously idle, and too detached from what transpires in the
material world. My aim in this section is to address this worry by discussing the
account of practical knowledge developed by Thomas Aquinas in his theory of
divine cognition, and showing its relevance to Anscombe's concerns. In particu-
lar, I argue that for Aquinas, a cognitive act is distinctively practical insofar as
it aims at effecting change in the world, where doing so lies within the power of
the knower. I begin with a summary of Aquinas' position (3.1), then develop it
further in connection with the issues raised above (3.2), arguing along the way
that it's reasonable to interpret Anscombe as adapting these Thomistic ideas to
her ends.25
3.1 Manners of knowing
For Aquinas and other medieval thinkers such as Augustine,26 the pseudony-
mous Dionysius the Areopagite,27 Averroës (Ibn Rushd),28 and Moses Mai-
monides,29 the concept of practical or productive knowledge figures most
prominently not in theories of human action, but in accounts of the distinc-
tive nature of God's knowledge of the created world. In Part I, Question 14 of
the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas frames his discussion of these matters in terms
of the idea that knowing is usually understood as a receptive act, where the
form of the known object is taken up by the mind of the knower. He insists,
however, that such a thing cannot take place in God, whose acts are not depen-
25I take it that Read Anscombe in light of Aquinas is a generally sound interpretive principle;
for a good illustration of its value, see Vogler 2002. As Anscombe's daughter Mary Geach
writes: Anscombe drew on [Aquinas'] thought to an unknowable extent: she said to me that
it aroused prejudice in people to tell them that a thought came to him: to my sister she said
that to ascribe a thought to him made people boringly ignore the philosophical interest of it,
whether they were for Aquinas or against him (Geach 2011, xix).
26E.g. in On the Trinity: Yet He [viz., God] does not ... know all His creatures, both
spiritual and corporeal, because they are, but they ... are because He knows them. For he
was not ignorant of what He was going to create. He created, therefore, because He knew; He
did not know because he created (Bk. IV, ch. 13, 22). Aquinas cites this passage at Summa
Theologiae I, q. 14, a. 8.
27E.g. in On the Divine Names: ... God does not have an individual knowledge of itself
and another knowledge of all beings in common. For knowing itself will the cause of all in any
way be ignorant of those which are from it and of which it is the cause? Hence God knows
beings by a knowledge of God, and not by a knowledge of beings (ch. 7, 2, 869b-c).
28E.g. in his Decisive Treatise, Determining the Nature of the Connection Between Religion
and Philosophy: ... God the Exalted knows [material particulars] in a way which is not of
the same kind as our way of knowing them. For our knowledge of them is an effect of the
object known, originated when it comes into existence and changing when it changes: whereas
Glorious God's Knowledge of existence is the opposite of this: it is the cause of the object
known, which is existent being (ch. 2, 10.18-22).
29E.g. in his Guide for the Perplexed : Our knowledge is acquired and increased in propor-
tion to the things known by us. This is not the case with God. His knowledge of things is not
derived from the things themselves: if this were the case, there would be change and plurality
in His knowledge; on the contrary, the things are in accordance with His eternal knowledge,
which has established their actual properties ... He fully knows His unchangeable essence, and
thus has a knowledge of all that results from any of His acts (Part III, ch. xxi).
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dent on anything outside himself.30 And he responds to this seeming dilemma
by arguing that knowledge may take different forms depending on the nature of
the knower,31 and thus since God's nature exists in a manner higher than that
by which creatures exist, his knowledge does not exist in him in the manner of
created knowledge (ST I, q. 14, a. 1, ad. 3). In particular, Aquinas argues that
since created things depend on God for their being, God can know his creation
simply by knowing his own ideas of it, as they exist in his own mind: God's
essence contains a likeness of the things that he has the power to make, and so
his self-knowledge is sufficient for knowledge of everything that lies in his power
(ibid., a. 5c). Thus, he says, it is a mistake to think that God's knowledge
of creation requires him to be in reception of anything, for in this knowledge
the principal object known . . . is nothing other than [God's] essence, which
contains all the species of things (ibid., ad. 1), just as fire contains the heat
that it imparts to other objects.
This idea, that one may know an object not just by having one's mind reflect
what is anyway there, but also by being the one who through her knowledge
brings that very object into existence, is at the center of Aquinas' conception
of practical cognition. Aquinas argues that practical and speculative forms of
knowledge can be distinguished in several different but interrelated ways, each
of which mirrors an element in Aristotle's discussion of practical thought in De
Anima III.10:32
 First, as Aristotle claims that the object of appetite is always something
attainable, or a good that can be brought into being by action (433a29-
3033), so Aquinas writes that the objects of practical knowledge must be
things producible by the knower: thus e.g. human knowledge of God or
30For an argument along these lines, see Summa Theologiae I, q. 14, a. 5, obj. 3. (Hereafter
referenced as `ST '. All quotations from Question 14 of the Prima Pars are from Davies' revised
translation in Aquinas 2006; all others are from the 1920 Blackfriars translation in Aquinas
2008.) As the quotations above suggest, this is roughly the way that the problem of divine
knowledge was framed by Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius as well; whereas for Averroës and
Maimonides, the problem is one of understanding how an unchanging God can have knowledge
of change in the created world, given that knowledge requires correspondence with the thing
that is known. It bears noting that neither of these questions is the same as the more familiar
worry about the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom; they apply equally
to God's knowledge of the non-free world.
31The background to this distinction is the traditional principle Omne quod est in aliquo
est in eo per modum eius in quo est : Whatever is in something, is in it according to the mode
of that in which it is. On several of Aquinas' various appeals to this principle, see Wippel
1995 and Tomarchio 1998.
32For the following distinctions, see ST I, q. 14, a. 16c. Though her reference there is to
Aristotle, I suspect that this passage is in the background of Anscombe's threefold distinction
in 33 of Intention between the theoretical syllogism, the idle practical syllogism which is
just a classroom example, and the practical syllogism proper, where in the last case the
conclusion is an action whose point is shewn by the premises, which are now, so to speak, on
active duty (I, 60; and cf. Anscombe 2005).
33In Intention, Anscombe quotes Aristotle as saying that practical reasoning must concern
what is capable of turning out variously (I, 60). She doesn't provide a reference, so I'm not
sure if this is the same passage, but the underlying point seems to be the same. (As Nat Stein
and Kim Frost have pointed out to me, Aristotle says similar things at NE III.3 and VI.7.)
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the natural world is necessarily speculative, whereas it is possible for us
to have practical knowledge of artifacts.
 Second, following Aristotle's claim that practical thought calculates means
to an end (433a14), Aquinas identifies a practical mode of knowing, in
which producible things are considered as producible. By way of con-
trast Aquinas gives the example of an architect who defines, analyses and
examines the qualities proper to houses in general  in this case the object
of his knowledge is something that lies within his power, but the mode in
which he knows it is not a practical one, as it involves only ascertaining
what a house is, without any concern with how to make one.
 Finally, following Aristotle's remark that practical thought differs from
speculative thought in the character of its end (433a15-16), Aquinas says
that knowledge can be either speculative or practical in terms of its end
or purpose. According to Aquinas, knowledge is practical in this respect
insofar as it aims at production or some other form of action, and specu-
lative in this respect insofar as it aims just at the consideration of truth:
thus e.g. the knowledge of builders who consider how some house could
be built, not with a view to building it but merely for the sake of knowing
will have a speculative end or purpose even though it is practical in its
object and mode  such knowledge is what we call idle speculation about
how something might be done, because it is not, as Anscombe puts it, on
active duty (I, 60). By contrast, for knowledge to have a practical end or
purpose is for the knowledge to have the aim of getting something done.
For Aquinas, then, the distinction between practical and speculative knowledge
is multi-dimensional: there are several respects in which knowledge might be
called speculative rather than practical or vice versa, and two of these re-
spects are independent of one another. Thus he offers the following division:
1. Knowledge is purely speculative whenever it is speculative with regard to
its objects (the first sense above), as nothing that does not lie within the
power of the agent can be the object of knowledge that is practical in
either of the other two senses;
2. Knowledge is purely practical whenever it is practical with regard to both
its mode and its end (the second and third senses above), since in this
case it must also be practical with regard to its objects; and
3. Knowledge is partly speculative and partly practical when it is practical
with regard to its objects and either:
(a) Practical in respect of its mode but not its end, as e.g. when one
considers what it would take to make something, though not in order
actually to produce it; or
(b) Practical in respect of its end but not its mode, as e.g. when one
defines what it is to be an artifact of a given kind in order later on
to determine how best to make it.
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Thus he concludes that God's knowledge is purely speculative where it concerns
his own essence (for even God does not have the power to change this); and
where created things are concerned it fits characterization (3(b)): these things
lie within God's power, and his knowledge of them aims at bringing them about;
but since we know created things speculatively, therefore God knows (yet much
more perfectly than we do) all that we speculatively know about things by defin-
ing and analysing, and therefore his knowledge of these things is speculative in
respect of its mode (ST I, q. 14, a. 16c).34
For our purposes, what is most important in this discussion is not the ty-
pology of divine knowledge, but the richness in Aquinas' conception of practical
thought. Aquinas' main idea is that knowledge is practical to the extent that
it is a doer's way of knowing: practical knowledge always concerns something
that one is able to bring about, and in knowing such a thing in a practical way
one may either be thinking of how to bring it about, or be thinking of it with
the aim of bringing it about, or both. As he writes in his commentary on De
Anima III.15:
. . . the intellect that produces movement is the intellect that acts
for the sake of something, not for the sake of reasoning alone. And
this is practical intellect, which differs from theoretical intellect as
regards its end. For theoretical intellect inquires into the truth not
for the sake of something else, but for the sake of truth alone, whereas
practical intellect's inquiry into truth is for action's sake. (In De
Anima III.15, 43-49)
Importantly, Aquinas emphasizes elsewhere in the Summa that this distinction
between speculative and practical intellectual activity does not require a distinc-
tion between two different intellects, or even two separate intellectual powers:
rather, the very same intellect whose activity is sometimes speculative, because
directed solely toward the apprehension of truth, can also be practical insofar
as it not only knows, but also directs the known truth to operation (ST I, q.
79, a. 11, ad. 2)  i.e., takes as its object the production of a certain sort of
thing.35 And in this way, the practical intellect of a human being is related to
what it has cognition of in the way that God is related to what He has cognition
of (ST I-II, q. 3, a. 5, ad. 1): a person's knowledge of what she creates or
otherwise brings about is similar to God's knowledge of the natural world. This,
I suggest, is also what Anscombe has in mind when she talks about practical
knowledge.
34This last point is somewhat obscure to a modern ear. Another way to draw this conclusion
would be to say that given God's power he has no need to calculate means to his ends, and
therefore his knowledge is never practical in its mode. I am not sure whether Aquinas would
endorse this.
35As Naus (1957, 17-34) argues, it does not seem that this was always Aquinas' position; in
his early writings he says things that conflict with it.
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3.2 Why the form matters
I argued in Section 2 that it is not enough to understand agential knowledge
as practical knowledge just insofar as this knowledge is required for a per-
son's movements and their effects to constitute a certain means-end order. The
most important reason for this was that such a characterization seems to be
compatible with its being entirely a happy accident that one's movements and
their effects correspond to her knowledge of them, and so is not enough to cap-
ture what is distinctively agential in the way a person knows what what she
is intentionally doing. Aquinas' conception of practical cognition seems not to
share this defect, however: on his account, one can have practical knowledge
only of things that lie within one's power, and only insofar as this knowledge is
aimed toward the exercise of this power in the activity of bringing those things
about. In this section, I will explore how these ideas can help to give us a
more satisfactory account of how agential knowledge is the cause of what it
understands.
Begin with Wittgenstein's example of the wind-blown leaves, whose judg-
ments about where they are going keep perfectly in line with their movements.
On the Thomistic view I outlined above, what disqualifies these thoughts from
amounting to practical knowledge of those movements is simple: namely, that
the leaves are entirely powerless to influence the way they are moving, but only
move because of how they are blown about by the wind. The same goes for other
knowledge an agent might have of the material world that is in some sense a
formal condition on their intentional activity: for example Vashti might know
that the thing she is cracking is an egg, and only be cracking an egg intentionally
because she knows this, but still this is not an instance of practical knowledge
because whether or not a particular thing is an egg is something that human
beings are (at least presently) powerless to effect, due to our inability to change
non-eggs into eggs and vice versa. It therefore fails to meet the first of the
three conditions specified above: that a certain thing is an egg is something
Vashti knows purely speculatively, though her knowing this is necessary for
her to exercise her agential powers in certain ways. Anscombe puts this point
by saying that knowledge like this is part of the account of exactly what is
happening at a given moment (say) to the material one is working on (I, 89)
 and though this knowledge is extremely useful in practice, nevertheless it's
intrinsically speculative.36
We can, then, build on the idea that agential knowledge is the principle
of an action's means-end order by adding that such knowledge is essentially
knowledge of something that lies within an agent's power : when a person knows
in a practical way that she is X-ing because she is Y-ing, then her X-ing and her
Y-ing themselves must be responsive to her will. The leaves' thoughts about
their movements don't satisfy this criterion, so they can't be a form of practical
36In a similar vein, Aquinas remarks that an agent's practical deliberation may take for
granted certain principles that are borrowed from some other way of knowing, including any
facts received through the sensesfor instance, that this is bread or iron (ST I-II, q. 14, a.
6c). Thanks to Stephen Brock for pointing this passage out to me.
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 can't be knowledge that constitutes their movements into a means-end order 
even if the leaves are moving in just the ways they suppose. However, this alone
is not enough to resolve our difficulties, as it is possible to know in a speculative
way things that one has the power to change but has decided just to leave as
they are, such as  to use an example of Anscombe's (I, 90)  the fact that one
is sliding down a bank, having been pushed by someone else. Here we have an
instance of what Anscombe calls voluntary but non-intentional activity,37 and
while the person's knowledge of her sliding would not be purely speculative in
sense (1) above, it would not be practical in the sense that distinguishes the
knowledge of one's intentional actions.
Since the concept of knowledge that is practical with respect to its objects
isn't enough to delineate the nature of agential knowledge, we should turn to the
next element in Aquinas' account of practical cognition, which is that a cognitive
act can be called practical rather than speculative insofar as it's concerned with
how to do a certain thing  that is, with identifying means to a given end.
Anscombe notes, however, that sometimes such thought is idle, and leads
only to judgments about what could be done (if one wanted ...): thus e.g.
the person sliding down the bank might think about how she might shift her
weight in order to keep herself going, without any intention of actually doing
so; and Vashti might explain to her daughter what it would take to make a
soué, but only to show that this is too much work for now, which is why
she'll just get a bowl of cereal instead. By contrast, a proper case of practical
thinking will be one where the conclusion is an action whose point is shewn by
the premises, which are now, so to speak, on active duty (I, 60). And it seems
clear that agential knowledge, understood as knowledge of what one is presently
intentionally doing, would have to be practical in this latter respect  that of
its end  whether or not it involves any means-end calculation.38
My suggestion, then, is that we read Anscombe as emphasizing what I have
called the scope and aim of agential knowledge as the features that make it
distinctively practical: in order for a person to know practically that she is X-
ing (or X-ing because she is Y-ing), then it must lie within her power to do this
or not to do it, and her knowledge that she is doing this must be ordered toward
the end of her acting this way.39 But how exactly are we to understand this
second idea, of knowledge that has an active or productive end or aim? I take
this idea to be at issue in Anscombe's example of the shopper and the detective:
37As she writes, in this case the movements are not one's own doing at all, but ... happen
to one's delight, so that one consents and does not protest or take steps against them (I, 89).
38For Anscombe, The mark of practical reasoning is that the thing wanted is at a distance
from the immediate action, and the immediate action is calculated as the way of getting or
doing or securing the thing wanted (I, 79; and cf. the discussion in 30 of Intention of whether
deliberation is required to exercise an acquired skill). I admit that I am uncomfortable with
the implication that such non-calculative agential knowledge would fit characterization (3(b))
above, of knowledge that is speculative in its end but not its mode, since it seems quite unlike
the knowledge of the builder who identifies what a house is in order to make one later on.
39For a similar suggestion in connection with the nature of practical reasoning, see Müller
1979; Vogler 2001, 2002. This is the element in his threefold division that Aquinas emphasizes
as well: e.g. at In VI Eth., lect. 2, 1133 and 1135; ST I, q. 79, a. 11; ST II-II, q. 45, a. 3;
and ST II-II, q. 47, a. 5.
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Let us consider a man going round a town with a shopping list in his
hand. Now it is clear that the relation of this list to the things he
actually buys is one and the same whether his wife gave him the list
or it is his own list; and that there is a different relation when a list
is made by a detective following him about. If he made the list itself,
it was an expression of intention; if his wife gave it to him, it has the
role of an order. What then is the identical relation to what happens,
in the order and the intention, which is not shared by the record?
It is precisely this: if the list and the things that the man actually
buys do not agree, and if this and this alone constitutes a mistake,
then the mistake is not in the list but in the man's performance
(If his wife were to say: `Look, it says butter and you have bought
margarine', he would hardly reply: `What a mistake! we must put
that right' and alter the word on the list to `margarine'); whereas if
the detective's record and what the man actually buys do not agree,
then the mistake is in the record. (I, 56)
The point of this example is that though what is written on these lists may
be exactly the same, the lists  or at least, the shopper's and the detective's
cognitive representations of them  are different in that the aim of the detective's
list is just to report the man's purchases, whereas the shopper's list is not
supposed to describe but rather to direct his activity.40 One aspect of this
distinction is what Anscombe notes here: if the detective writes down something
that the man does not buy, then his list contains an error; but if the shopper
fails to get something that is included on his list (and not because he couldn't
find it, or didn't have the money, or decided it wasn't worth buying after all,
etc.), this will constitute an error in what he has done, whereas his list will
still be perfectly in order.41 But the difference also comes out if we consider
the distinctive causal role that the shopper's list plays in the way he acts. For
example, suppose that the shopper is picking up a stick of butter from a display
case. If he intends to be buying butter and not margarine, then it seems that the
following counterfactual must hold: all else being equal, if he comes to believe
that he is picking up margarine rather than butter, he will put the margarine
down and look for some butter instead; whereas if he retains the belief that he
is picking up a stick of butter, he will go ahead and put it in his basket.42 In
this respect, the shopper's knowledge that he is picking up butter rather than
margarine plays a role in guiding or controlling his activity: this knowledge is
part of the way that he ensures he buys the things he means to. And here
40As Kim Frost (2014) has persuasively argued, this is not the same as the idea that the
representations have different directions of fit.
41Though she credits this distinction to Theophrastus, Anscombe surely had found it in
Thomas Aquinas as well. E.g. ST I, q. 14, a. 8 ad. 3: . . . just as the knowable things of
nature are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, God's knowledge is prior to natural
things, and is their measure. In the same way a house mediates between the knowledge of the
architect who made it and that of those who get their knowledge of the house from the house
itself once it is made.
42The point of the qualification all else being equal is to rule out a case where e.g. the man's
intentions also change, perhaps because he decides that he can just as well buy margarine.
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we might contrast this to a different sort of situation, where the man selects
something from the display case just to see what it is: in this case, if the man
judges at first that he is picking up a stick of butter and then realizes that it
is margarine instead, this will be a reason to revise his judgment, but not to
put the margarine down and look for something else. In this second case, the
man's judgment that he is selecting butter is expressive of theoretical knowledge,
because it is formed for the sake of truth alone, and not with the aim of getting
any particular thing done. By contrast, to have practical knowledge of a certain
aspect of what one is doing is to know it in a way that plays a guiding role in
the execution of that action (so described), in which case that aspect of one's
self-knowledge has as its aim the production of the thing it represents.
This sort of structure is made more explicit in Anscombe's well-known ex-
ample of the man pumping poisoned water, which I discuss at more length in
Section 4. Of this example, Anscombe says that if a man claims that he is not
intentionally poisoning the inhabitants of the house whose cistern he is filling
with poisoned water, we might try to find out whether this claim is true by
eliciting some obviously genuine reaction by saying such things as ... `Well,
then you won't be much interested to hear that the poison is old and won't
work'  (I, 48). Saying such a thing would be a way of calling into question
whether the man's action is intentional under the description poisoning the
inhabitants: if the man's judgment that he is poisoning the inhabitants is a
practical judgment (i.e., a judgment that aims at the production of what it
represents), then when this is questioned he will likely express frustration or
try to fix things by switching to some more effective poison.43 As Anscombe
admits, such methods of determining a person's intentions are always imperfect,
since the man might either react in a way that disguises his true intentions or
simply abandon the intention to poison the inhabitants when he realizes he is
not succeeding. Nevertheless, they are premised on the assumption that doing
something intentionally involves using one's knowledge that one is X-ing to keep
one's X-ing on course, and modifying one's behavior where appropriate.44 And
such an end is (at least usually) absent from the knowledge one has of things
that aren't one's intentional actions, as e.g. if the man at the pump happens
to notice that his movement is casting a shadow on a rockery where at one
place and from one position it produces a curious effect as if a face were looking
out of the rockery (I, 37): if casting such a shadow is something the man is
doing non-intentionally, then if he knows about it at all he will know it only in
a speculative way, detached from any aim of acting in a way that falls under
43Similarly, Anscombe remarks that if the man distracts the attention of one of the inhabi-
tants from something about the water source that might suggest the truth, then the question
`Why did you call him from over there?' must have a credible answer other than `to prevent
him from seeing'; and a multiplication of such points needing explanation would cast doubt
on his claim not to have done anything with a view to facilitating the poisoning (I, 43) 
that is, whether his conception of himself as poisoning the inhabitants is practical, because
ordered toward the end of their poisoning.
44Similarly, Müller interprets Anscombe's appeal to Aquinas as suggesting a conception of
practical knowledge as a konstitutive Handlungsbedingung, involving die Disposition des
Handelnden, die `gewusste' Handlung auszuführen (Müller 1999, 554).
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this description.45
So here again is my proposal: a person's knowledge of what she is intention-
ally doing is a form of practical thought, different from the way one thinks of
other things, insofar as this knowledge does not idly accompany one's behavior
as a mere representation of it, but is rather an integral component of its object,
playing a distinctive causal role in the execution of the very action that it rep-
resents. It is insofar as the knowledge of what one is doing plays such a role
that it stands as form to the matter of a person's behavior, and is something
without which she would not be acting intentionally as she is. Knowledge that
lacks this characteristic cannot be practical knowledge, and what it is knowledge
of cannot be one's own intentional action.
3.3 A remaining question
Of course there is more to be said. Inquiring minds want to hear more about
this concept of a practical aim or end: Is having such an end solely a mat-
ter of the causal connection of knowledge to a person's behavior? Is this the
sort of thing that could be analyzed reductively (say, in dispositional terms),
so that teleological and agential concepts would drop out? They want to know
more about the status of practical knowledge: What exactly is its connection
to practical reasoning? Is talk of practical knowledge enough to supply an
Anscombean alternative to what she called the standard approach of explain-
ing intentional action as behavior that is caused by belief and desire (Anscombe
2005, 111)? Could it be developed instead in a way that is consonant with such
an approach?46 (If so, should it?) Is knowing in a practical way that one is
doing something only a necessary condition on doing it intentionally, or also a
sufficient one? And is it never possible to do something intentionally without
outright knowing that one is doing this? I'm sorry to say that with the exception
of this last question, all these issues lie outside the scope of this paper.
What I will do, however, is return in light of this account of practical cog-
nition to a point I made at the start of Section 1, namely that as I read her,
Anscombe's little-understood claim that agential knowledge is practical knowl-
edge is much more important to her argument in Intention than the better-
known claim that this knowledge is always knowledge without observation.
Thus far in the paper, I have said a great deal about the former doctrine, but
next to nothing about the latter. Yet when Anscombe gives what seems to
be her paradigmatic illustration of practical knowledge, its independence from
perception is front and center:
45Against this sort of suggestion, Sarah Paul (2011, 17) writes that As long as the repre-
sentational relation between agent and action is held to be a cognitive, knowledge-apt repre-
sentation, the foreseen side effects will not escape inclusion in the content of what is intended.
But this overlooks the possibility that cognitive, knowledge-apt representations may play
different roles in an agent's mental and behavioral economy depending on whether what they
represent is an intended action or a foreseen side-effect. However, resolution of the intend-
ing/foreseeing distinction lies beyond the scope of this paper.
46For some attempts to do this, see Velleman 2007a; Setiya 2003, 2007, 2008. I discuss their
views at more length in my MS Why We Know What We're Doing.
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Imagine someone directing a project, like the erection of a building
which he cannot see and does not get reports on, purely by giving
orders. His imagination (evidently a superhuman one) takes the
place of the perception that would ordinarily be employed by the
director of such a project. He is not like a man merely considering
speculatively how a thing might be done; such a man can leave
many points unsettled, but this man must settle everything in a
right order. His knowledge of what is done is practical knowledge.
(I, 82)
Clearly, Anscombe thinks the concept of practical knowledge can help her to
explain why agential knowledge is always knowledge without observation. She
admits later on that a case like the one just described is very improbable, as
a person in this position usually makes use of his senses, or of reports given
him, the whole time (ibid., 88)  yet on her account, even when this feedback
is unavailable the practical thought of such an agent suffices on its own to be
practical knowledge of what is happening, as it is contrary to the nature of
practical knowledge that it ever be grounded in sense-perception. As I will
argue in the next section, I think that Anscombe is wrong about this, and that
it rests on assimilating the human mode of practical knowledge too closely to
God's.
4 The Practical Thought of a Finite Agent
I have proposed that a person's knowledge of her intentional actions is a form of
practical knowledge insofar it aims at the execution of the action that is known,
and thus plays a role in the dynamic process of self-guidance by which a person
keeps her intentional behaviors on course. In this respect, what you know of
your intentional actions makes an indispensable contribution to how you act.
But Anscombe says more than this: she holds not only that when one knows
what one is intentionally doing this knowledge is distinctively practical, but also
that an agent always has such knowledge of her intentional actions, and that
this knowledge is necessarily secured without observation, or independently of
the perception of one's behavior and its consequences. Thus she writes:
. . . the topic of an intention may be matter on which there is knowl-
edge or opinion based on observation, inference, hearsay, superstition
or anything that knowledge or opinion are ever based on; or again
matter on which an opinion is held without any foundation at all.
When knowledge or opinion are present concerning what is the case,
and what can happensay Zif one does certain things, say ABC,
then it is possible to have the intention of doing Z in doing ABC;
and if the case is one of knowledge or if the opinion is correct, then
doing or causing Z is an intentional action, and it is not by observa-
tion that one knows one is doing Z; or in so far as one is observing,
inferring etc. that Z is actually taking place, one's knowledge is
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not the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions. By
the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions I mean the
knowledge that one denies having if when asked e.g. `Why are you
ringing that bell?' one replies `Good heavens! I didn't know I was
ringing it!' (I, 50-51)
In this passage, Anscombe clearly allows that human agents are unlike God in
that perception is often required for us to know various background facts  e.g.
that this is an egg, that cracking an egg with such-and-such force is likely to
break it, etc.  that are presupposed in the exercise of our agential powers.
But once this knowledge is in place, she says, and an action is unfolding, the
knowledge of what one is doing is grounded in just the same way as God's
knowledge of creation, namely in the non-receptive knowledge of oneself as an
active principle who is directing one's intellect to action. Perception serves as
a background condition for human agency, and often figures indispensably in
our bringing things about, but an agent's practical knowledge of her actions is
always grounded independently of it.
However, it is not clear that Aquinas' conception of the practical intellect
guarantees this strong position. As we have seen, that conception develops
out of an attempt to understand God's knowledge of creation, which must be
wholly non-receptive if God is to be the source of everything that is. But this
is not true of human agents: for us, simply saying the word is not enough
to ensure that things will unfold according to our will; we need to intervene
continually in order to keep things on course, and despite our best efforts we
sometimes fail to realize our intentions.47 For Aquinas, this difference comes
out in the fact that a human agent can impose forms on things only in a way
that presupposes the presence of a suitable material substrate, whereas God
is the sufficient cause of form and matter alike: this is how God's knowledge
of his own essence is sufficient for knowing created things not merely in their
universal natures, but also in their individuality (ST I, q. 14, a. 11c), since
on Aquinas' account the individuality of created things is guaranteed by their
material aspects. By contrast, he says that a human artisan could have purely
non-receptive knowledge of an individual material thing only if this knowledge
produced the whole of something, not merely its form (ibid.), which is not
something we are ever able to do.
In what follows, I'll argue, contra Anscombe and several of her recent inter-
preters, that the materiality of human action  the fact that doing something
intentionally comprises not just having in mind an end or aim, and conceiving
of one's action in light of this, but also moving one's body and thereby causing
other things to happen in the material world  means that our knowledge of
what we are doing can be partly receptive, and so grounded in our sensory per-
ception of our movements and their effects. I will also argue, however, that this
47Cf. Sebastian Rödl's remark that since the human will is finite, therefore in realizing its
object, the will depends on conditions that are not its own deed. It depends on a matter in
which to realize itself (Rödl 2011, 219). Anton Ford (2013) makes a similar point, noting
that a human agent necessarily confronts a world of preexisting obstacles and opportunities
that provide the background to successful (or unsuccessful) bodily action.
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doesn't render this knowledge speculative rather than practical, since it still has
action as its end. The result will be a thorough divorce of the concept of prac-
tical knowledge from the concept of knowledge that is grounded independently
of perception.
4.1 False practical self-conceptions
I begin with a possibility that Anscombe herself seems to allow for, in which a
person believes herself to be acting in a way that she is not. Consider again her
example of the man operating a water pump:
A man is pumping water into the cistern which supplies the drink-
ing water of a house. Someone has found a way of systematically
contaminating the source with a deadly cumulative poison whose ef-
fects are unnoticeable until they can no longer be cured. The house
is regularly inhabited by a small group of party chiefs, with their im-
mediate families, who are in control of a great state; they are engaged
in exterminating the Jews and perhaps plan a world war.The man
who contaminated the source has calculated that if these people are
destroyed some good men will get into power who will govern well,
or even institute the Kingdom of Heaven on earth and secure a good
life for all the people; and he has revealed the calculation, together
with the fact about the poison, to the man who is pumping. The
death of the inhabitants of the house will, of course, have all sorts
of other effects; e.g. that a number of people unknown to these men
will receive legacies, about which they know nothing. (I, 37)
As we have seen, Anscombe holds that the intentional form of such a per-
son's intentional activity is supplied by the implicit structure of his practical
reasoning, as might be brought out in his explanations of why he is acting as
he is:
E.g. `Why are you moving your arm up and down?'`I'm pumping'.
`Why are you pumping?'`I'm pumping the water-supply for the
house'. `Why are you beating out that curious rhythm?'`Oh, I
found out how to do it, as the pump does click anyway, and I do
it just for fun'. `Why are you pumping the water?'`Because it's
needed up at the house' and (sotto voce) `To polish that lot off'.
`Why are you poisoning these people?'`If we can get rid of them,
the other lot will get in and . . . ' (ibid., 38)
Concerning all these things that the man describes himself as doing, Anscombe
says that in each case it is correct to say not merely: the man is X-ing, but also:
`the man is Y-ing'if that is, nothing falsifying the statement `He is Y-ing' can
be observed (ibid.). But what if some such thing can be observed, such that
the agent's own conception of his behavior contains a falsehood? In fact there
are at least two different ways in which this sort of thing may happen.48
48For a similar distinction, see Rödl 2011, 220-230.
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First, Anscombe considers the possibility that unknown to the man pump-
ing, there [is] a hole in the pipe round the corner: because of this, she writes,
something is not the case which would have to be the case in order for his
statement [that he is replenishing the water supply] to be true (I, 56). Call
this kind of case a practical failure: it is a situation where, despite selecting a
means that is generally appropriate to his end, a person is not bringing about
the effects that he is aiming for. Second, we might suppose that instead of the
pipe being broken, the man has simply chosen the wrong pump, and is pump-
ing water into the cistern of a different house instead: let us call this kind of
case a practical error, a case where a person is not achieving his aim because
of a mistake in practical reasoning (here, a false minor premise in his practical
syllogism). And practical failures and practical errors alike have the potential
to result in what I will call false practical self-conceptions, or cases in which one
believes oneself to be doing something that one is not doing after all: e.g. in the
cases I have described, if the man judges I am pumping water into the cistern
because I am poisoning the inhabitants, then his judgment will be mistaken. In
Aquinas' terms, the reason why this is possible is that whether a person's action
has a certain form is dependent on the presence of suitable matter, and since
the practical thought of a finite agent is the sufficient principle only of the form
of her actions, it is possible for one's practical self-conception to be mistaken in
those cases where one unwittingly fails to bring the necessary material events
about.49
As we have seen, the proper understanding of false practical self-conceptions
is an important topic in Intention, and Anscombe insists that they are quite
different from ordinary factual errors. However, she does not seem to go so far
as to deny outright that a false practical self-conception embodies any kind of
factual error at all. E.g., she writes:
. . . is there not possible another case in which a man is simply not
doing what he says? As when I say to myself `Now I press Button
A'pressing Button Ba thing which can certainly happen. This
I will call the direct falsification of what I say. And here . . . the
mistake is not one of judgment but of performance. That is, we do
not say: What you said was a mistake, because it was supposed to
describe what you did and did not describe it, but: What you did
was a mistake, because it was not in accordance with what you said.
(I, 57)
What Anscombe says here is clearly an articulation of Aquinas' claim that
practical knowledge measures its object and provides the standard for its truth,
instead of being measured by how things are: the idea is that the role of practical
thought is to say how things are to be, whereas speculative thought says just how
49Anscombe writes that the failure to execute intentions is necessarily the rare exception (I,
87), but then qualifies this significantly by saying that What is necessarily the rare exception
is for a man's performance in its more immediate descriptions not to be what he supposes
(ibid.; emphasis added). Yet clearly it is not just these descriptions that the theory of action
needs to be concerned with.
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things will be or are. Thus if one says I am X-ing when in fact one is not, this
reveals a kind of error in what one is doing, and so the facts are, so to speak,
impugned for not being in accordance with the words, rather than vice versa
(I, 4-5). I have argued that this feature of practical knowledge is manifested in
what one will do if one realizes one's mistake: unless one alters one's intention
or chooses to act deceptively the response to such a realization will be to change
one's behavior so that it conforms to one's practical self-conception, instead of
updating this self-conception so that it conforms to what one is anyway doing.
This is what it is for practical thought to have as its end not truth alone, but
truth for action's sake.
But while this much seems right, it should not taken to show that there can
be no such thing as a false practical self-conception after all. At certain places
in Intention, Anscombe seems to flirt with this idea, suggesting that judgments
of the form I am X-ing may have the same representational structure (or
direction of fit, in the contemporary parlance) as commands or shopping lists:
such an utterance represents something as to be done, and so is not shown to
have been in error if things do not turn out the way it says.50 As she writes,
echoing the lines quoted just above:
Orders . . . can be disobeyed, and intentions fail to get executed.
That intention [to write `I am a fool' on the blackboard] would not
have been executed if something had gone wrong with the chalk or
the surface, so that the words did not appear. And my knowledge
would have been the same even if this had happened. If then my
knowledge is independent of what actually happens, how can it be
knowledge of what does happen? Someone might say that it was a
funny sort of knowledge that was still knowledge even though what it
is knowledge of was not the case! On the other hand Theophrastus'
remark holds good: `the mistake is in the performance, not in the
judgment'. (I, 82)
According to the position that appears to be suggested by the last few sentences
of this quotation, the fact that a person fails to do what she takes herself to be
doing does not show that this person lacks practical knowledge of her actions:
for such knowledge is independent of what actually happens. And Anscombe
draws out for us the evident consequence of such a position, namely that in such
a case this practical knowledge cannot then be knowledge of what is happening
50Something like this seems to be the position of Eric Marcus in Rational Causation: he
writes that when a person makes a judgment of the form I am φ-ing, this judgment is simply
an expression of his representing φ-ing as to be done, and not at all the agent's estimation of
whether a certain proposition is to be believed or not, since it is not the agent's attempt to
describe the world (Marcus 2012, 79, 71; emphasis added). But this view seems incapable of
explaining why I am φ-ing, said as an expression of what one is intentionally doing, entails
that someone is φ-ing  which it clearly does, since it might be used to answer the question Is
anyone around here φ-ing? Moreover, taking this line requires Marcus to reject Anscombe's
talk of practical knowledge of one's actions, since it tends to be interpreted . . . as the thesis
that we have a belief about what we are doing that we are justified in holding (ibid., 66n).
By contrast, my concern here is precisely with this idea, which to me seems incontrovertible.
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 which is exactly the sort of thing that agent's knowledge was supposed to be,
namely knowledge of what is done. If practical knowledge were only supposed
to be knowledge of what one ought to do, then this would be no problem: in
that case its soundness would be based in reasons suggesting what it would be
good to make happen with a view to an objective, or with a view to a sound
objective (I, 4),51 rather than ones pertaining to what is actually taking place.
Yet Anscombe holds that practical knowledge is the knowledge of what one is
doing, so this interpretation of her position is intolerable.52
However, there is a great deal of textual evidence for believing that Anscombe
did not hold a position along these lines, and thought instead that sincere judg-
ments of the form I am X-ing are not always expressive of knowledge. For
example, in the case described above she says that if the water is not going
through the pipe then the man's claim that he is replenishing the water supply
is not true (I, 56); and when she first introduces the idea of a mistake of per-
formance in discussing the expression of intention, it is to explain how there
are other ways of saying what is not true, besides lying and being mistaken
(ibid., 4; emphasis added).53 Surely, though, if what one says is not true then
it cannot express knowledge of what one says to be the case, even if the cause
of this falsehood is a practical mistake  a failure to act as one intends to 
instead of a simply theoretical one. As Adrian Haddock writes, the best way to
51This is essentially the Aristotelian concept of practical truth: see e.g. Nicomachean
Ethics VI.2, where the good of the practical intellect is defined as truth in agreement with
right desire (1139a30-31). On the importance of distinguishing the concept of practical
knowledge as the knowledge of what one is doing from the knowledge of what to do, see
Müller 1999, 555 and Engstrom 2009, 54-56. For accounts of how these concepts might be
related, see Rödl 2011 and Tenenbaum 2011.
52Another troubling passage is Anscombe's summary of the incorrigibly contemplative
conception of knowledge that she takes to be characteristic of modern philosophy: Knowledge
must be something that is judged as such by being in accordance with the facts. The facts,
reality, are prior, and dictate what is to be said, if it is knowledge (I, 57). Clearly there
are two distinct ideas here: (1) in knowledge, what is judged must be in accordance with the
facts; (2) in knowledge, the reality is wholly prior to the knowledge of it. I take the concept of
practical knowledge to be a concept of knowledge for which condition (2) does not hold; but
still it must be bound by condition (1), or else it is not knowledge at all. In the same vein,
Aquinas writes at ST II-II, q. 33, a. 1c that whereas speculative reason only apprehends
things, . . . practical reason not only apprehends but also causes them (emphasis added) 
the talk of apprehension in this context seems to imply that practical knowledge must be
factive. For related objections to reading Anscombe as holding that practical knowledge can
be non-factive, see McDowell 2010, 2013.
53Similarly, she writes: Sometimes, jokingly, we are pleased to say of a man `He is doing
such-and-such' when he manifestly is not. E.g. `He is replenishing the water-supply', when
this is not happening because, as we can see but he cannot, the water is pouring out of a hole
in the pipe on the way to the cistern (I, 39; emphasis added). And again: Say I go over
to the window and open it. Someone who hears me moving calls out: What are you doing
making that noise? I reply `Opening the window'. I have called such a statement knowledge
all along; and precisely because in such a case what I say is trueI do open the window;
and that means that the window is getting opened by the movements of the body out of
whose mouth those words come (ibid., 51; emphasis added). It is important to notice how
material this very last clause is. However, as Eric Marcus points out to me, in all these
passages Anscombe is speaking only of falsehood in what a person says; she does not (as far
as I know) say explicitly that there can be such falsehood in an agent's judgments about what
she is doing. So the text may not settle the issue.
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interpret Anscombe is as saying that while in a case like this the mistake is in
the performance, not in the judgement, still a mistake was in the judgement
(Haddock 2010, 257): for one judged falsely that one was doing something which
in fact one was not.54
Understanding that Anscombe allows for this sort of falsity in a person's
practical self-conception helps us to see what is mistaken in another way some
philosophers have tried to defend her view of agential knowledge, by appeal
to the openness and broadness of the progressive verb-form is X-ing. As
Anscombe writes:
A man can be doing something which he nevertheless does not do, if
it is some process or enterprise which it takes time to complete and
of which therefore, if it is cut short at any time, we may say that he
was doing it, but did not do it. (I, 39)
For this reason, we might suppose, just as Vashti can be making a soué even
if the ingredients she is combining are appropriate to a cake instead, so the man
at the pump may be replenishing the water supply even if the pipe that runs
there is broken.55 But while it is certainly true that not every mistake in what
a person is doing will constitute a gap in that person's practical knowledge,
the claim that such a thing can never happen is not endorsed by Anscombe,
and it is also quite problematic philosophically. It is not Anscombe's view,
because as we have just seen she explicitly allows the possibility of cases where
a man is simply not doing what he says  and she needs to allow for this,
not only because it is evidently possible, but also because of her conviction that
there is point in speaking of knowledge only where a contrast exists between
`he knows' and `he (merely) thinks he knows'  (ibid., 14): if then there is going
to be a point in speaking of the knowledge of what one is intentionally doing,
there had better be such a thing as getting such matters wrong.56 Moreover,
54Compare Müller, who writes that in such a case Falsifiziert wird, was man sagt, während
gleichzeitig der Fehler in dem liegt, was man tut (Müller 1999, 548n). For a similar point, see
Moran 2004, 61 and McDowell 2010, 429-430. In a more recent paper, McDowell writes of the
I am a fool passage that there is a sense in which the state of the agent's practical intellect
will be the same regardless of whether she is writing what she means to: Der Unterschied
zwischen beiden Situationen liegt nicht im Zustand ihres praktischen Intellekts, sondern in
dem Umstand, dass die Worte in der einen Situation geschrieben werden und in der anderen
nicht (McDowell 2013, 397). But the idea that the state of an agent's practical intellect
can be entirely the same regardless of whether she is doing what she intends seems to me to
rest on the sort of common factor analysis of cognition that McDowell has argued against so
forcefully in the realm of speculative thought, and that he (rightly, in my view) sees Anscombe
as trying to develop in the realm of practice. Saying that there is a respect in which an agent's
cognitive state will be the same in good cases as in bad ones should not require denying that
there are some very important respects in which they will differ, lest the falsity of a practical
judgment should seem to be the sort of thing that lies outside an agent's ken. I explore this
point further in my MS Self-Consciousness in Thought and Action.
55This idea is explored in Falvey 2000; Paul 2009a; Haddock 2011; Thompson 2011; Mar-
cus 2012; Small 2012; Wolfson 2012; Lavin 2013b. I discuss it at greater length in my MS
Perception and Self-Consciousness.
56I am not saying that this consideration is in fact definitive, but only noting that Anscombe
seems to have thought so.
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to deny this possibility would be to try to take what Anscombe calls the false
avenue of escape of saying that I really `do' in the intentional sense whatever
I think I am doing. E.g. if I think I am moving my toe, but it is not actually
moving, then I am `moving my toe' in a certain sense, and as for what happens,
of course I haven't any control over that except in an accidental sense (ibid.,
52). Against this idea, Anscombe says that when I act intentionally I do what
happens (ibid.): identifying my action with whatever I think I am doing would
make it mysterious how intentional activity could ever be part of the publicly
observable world.57 Though we are usually right in our judgments about what
we are intentionally doing, still it is possible for us to get such matters wrong.
4.2 Doing (intentionally) without knowing
So Anscombe allows that there can be such a thing as a false practical self-
conception, a circumstance in which one takes oneself to be doing something
that one is not doing after all. But once we grant this, we appear forced to
concede that there may also be cases in which a person is doing what he or she
intends to, and yet the possibility of a practical failure or practical error is too
nearby for that person to have knowledge of this fact.
For example, suppose first that unbeknownst to the man at the pump, the
pipe that leads to the water supply is generally quite unreliable, though today
the water happens to be flowing through it just fine. Or again, suppose that
there are two indistinguishable pumps, one running to the house where the party
chiefs live and the other running to a different house, and that the man happens
to have noticed only the correct one, and set to work at it. In the first case the
man has barely avoided what I have termed a practical failure; in the second he
has come similarly close to making a practical error. Now suppose that in each
case the man is working the pump, and believes that by pumping the water,
he is replenishing the water supply of the party chiefs' house: this aspect of his
self-conception may be practical in the sense defined above, since the man would
adjust his behavior if he knew he were wrong. Moreover, on the account given
here the man needs to have this practical self-conception if he is to count as
replenishing the water supply intentionally by means of his pumping: in order
for his action to have this means-end structure it must be the case that he
conceives of it in these terms, and has the appropriate dispositions to adjust his
behavior in light of what he knows of it. Yet the man's practical thought about
his action will not amount to knowledge that he is doing this unless he knows
that his pumping is bringing it about, in the appropriate way,58 that the party
chiefs' water supply is being replenished  and in these circumstances, he seems
to lack the background knowledge necessary to know that this is happening.
57For a similar point, see McDowell 2013, 392-394.
58That is to say, his pumping must not be bringing about the replenishing of the water
supply in the way it would be if, say, the man were moving the pump according to a certain
rhythm and someone else heard this rhythm and took it as his sign to replenish the water
supply. Compare Anscombe's remark that an intended effect just occasionally comes about
by accident (I, 39).
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In a case like this one, the practical thought that renders a person's action
intentional under a given description will not amount to the practical knowledge
that she is doing what she intends: which is just what we should expect, given
human agents' finitude.59
Against the claim that this sort of thing is possible, Sebastian Rödl has
argued that it rests on an illicit division between practical thought and the
power to act in the way one judges to be best:
The power to reason about what to do is a power to do things. For,
in the fundamental case, thinking that such-and-such is to be done
because ____ is the causality of an action explanation that one is
doing it because ____. Since practical thinking is, fundamentally,
acting, the power of practical thought is a power to act. (Rödl 2007,
59-60)
Rödl's idea seems to be that since, as Anscombe writes, the conclusion of a
practical syllogism is not just an idle decision but rather an action whose point
is shewn by the premises (I, 60), so the knowledge that is the result of such a
piece of practical reasoning is not only the knowledge of what is good to do, but
rather the knowledge that one is doing that very thing. And this is supposed to
be explained by the fact that one can reason practically in a way that issues in
a certain action only if one has the power so to act: this relationship between
practical reason and the power to act means that there is no gap between
thinking that something is good to do, and doing it.60
Similarly, in a striking passage in Authority and Estrangement, Richard
Moran argues that there is a close parallel between the way we know our in-
tentional actions and the way we know our beliefs and intentions. According to
Moran, any agent who can conceive of himself as capable of forming an inten-
tion and implementing it . . . must take his intentional action to be determined
by his reasons, and thus he is in a position to know a true description of his
action in knowing his reasons (Moran 2001, 127). He continues:
The stance from which a person speaks with any authority about
his belief or his action is not a stance of causal explanation but
59Importantly, this argument does not require an infallibilist conception of knowledge (con-
tra Velleman 2007b, 19-20 and Newstead 2006, 15-18). For example, if the man is faced with
nine pumps connected to the house and one running elsewhere, then if he has chosen the right
one his belief that he is replenishing the water supply might count as knowledge. The point is
not that we must be certain or absolutely infallible about what we are doing in order to have
knowledge of it, but only that we need to have at least decent grounds for our belief. Kenny
seems to deny this requirement, writing that For speculative knowledge, in general, at least
three things need to be the case for it to be true that X knows that p: first, that X believes
that p, second, that p be true, and third, that X has grounds, i.e. good reason, for believing
that p. In the case of practical knowledge only the first two are necessary (Kenny 1979,
35). But he never explains why the justification-condition should be thought not to apply to
practical knowledge, and this seems no less strange than thinking that such knowledge can be
non-factive.
60Of course we need to account for cases of akrasia and weakness of will. For a promising
attempt to do this within a framework similar to Rödl's, see Marcus 2012, 79-86.
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the stance of rational agency. In belief as in intentional action,
the stance of the rational agent is the stance where reasons that
justify are at issue, and hence the stance from which one declares the
authority of reason over one's belief and action. Anscombe's question
why is asking not for what might best explain the movement that
constitutes the agent's action, but instead is asking for the reasons
he takes to justify his action, what he is aiming at. It is as an
expression of the authority of reason here that [a person] can and
must answer the question of his belief or action by reflection on the
reasons in favor of his belief or action. To do otherwise would be
for him to take the course of his belief or his intentional action to
be up to something other than his sense of the best reasons, and
if he thinks that, then there's no point in his deliberating about
what to do. Indeed, there is no point in calling it deliberation any
more, if he takes it to be an open question whether this activity will
determine what he actually does or believes. (ibid.)
Moran's claim is that just as the question Do I believe that p? is normally
transparent to the question whether p, so the question Am I X-ing? is normally
transparent to the question whether X-ing is the thing to do. In each case he
allows that this authority can be partial or hedged in various ways (ibid.):
for example, I may find myself compulsively unable to believe something that
seems obviously to be true, or unable to bring myself to do something despite my
judgment that I should. Such a condition, however, necessarily compromises
the extent to which I can think of my behavior as intentional action, or think
of my state of mind as involving a belief rather than an obsessional thought or
a compulsion: in the psychologically normal situation, the stance from which
a person relates to his attitudes and his intentional actions must express the
priority of justifying reasons over purely explanatory ones (ibid., 128).
But even if Rödl and Moran are right to identify the power of practical
reason with the power to act in the way one judges best, still we have seen that
in the case of human agency this power is not infallible: a person may start
with an end that is actually quite bad, select a means that does not conduce
to that end at all, or fail for one reason or another to actualize that means
in the way she acts. Mistakes of the latter two sorts open up the possibility
that a person may judge that something is the thing to do without thereby
doing it, though not through any weakness of will; and by the same token it
seems possible, as in the case above where the man luckily selects the correct
pump, that a person's judgment that he or she is doing a certain thing may
happen to be a true judgment even though it lacks the justification necessary
to count as knowledge.61 Importantly, in a case like this there is no alienation,
nothing that compromises the extent to which one can think of one's behavior as
61One objection to this argument would hold that to the extent that a person's justification
for believing that she is X-ing is compromised in this way, so also is the extent to which her
X-ing is intentional, as opposed to merely a matter of luck. (Thanks here to Randy Clarke,
Eric Marcus, and Will Small.) I cannot consider this point at length here, but will simply
say that it seems very unintuitive: on our ordinary conception, the level of agential reliability
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intentional: practical failures and practical errors are mistakes in the execution
of an action, which is something entirely different from the inability to commit
oneself to an action or state of mind that one judges to be best. In certain cases
a person's background knowledge may make it possible for her to know that
she is executing her chosen action simply in virtue of having chosen to do it,
but focusing just on cases like these obscures those where merely choosing to
do something is not enough to know that one is doing it. Within that range, it
is possible for a person who is doing something intentionally to have a practical
conception of what she is doing that does not amount to practical knowledge.62
4.3 Perceptual practical knowledge
Once we see the possibility that a person may believe falsely that she is doing
something that she is not, or be doing something intentionally without knowing
that she is doing it, we are in a position to see a final sort of possibility, in which
a person's knowledge that she is intentionally doing something is grounded in
the perception of this very action.
For instance, imagine now that the man at the pump has been informed that
the pipe running from it to the cistern is frequently broken, or that the cistern
is supplied by one of two pumps that are visually indistinguishable from one
another, but then is given a device that will tell him the quantity of poison in
the party chiefs' water supply. And suppose that as he operates the pump, he
sees on the device that the levels of poison are rising, and thereby knows that
his pumping is replenishing the water supply of the party chiefs' house  that
is, it is in virtue of what he sees on the display of the device that he knows that
the event that his pumping is aimed at is actually taking place. In this case,
the man's knowledge that he is replenishing the water supply is clearly a form
of agent's knowledge: for it is, once again, a practical way of knowing insofar
as he utilizes this knowledge in keeping his action on course. Nevertheless, the
man will rely on perception not just for background information concerning
what is the case, and what can happen . . . if one does certain things, but also
in order to know what is happening : namely, that he is poisoning the water
supply as he intends to. Here again, the epistemic situation of a finite human
agent may be different from that of a divine one: it is possible for our practical
self-conceptions to be knowledgeable only because we can perceive that we are
doing the things we intend to do.
In Intention, Anscombe tries to head off this sort of argument by distin-
required for an action to be intentional is lower than the level of cognitive reliability required
for a belief to be knowledge. I would be interested to see an alternative view worked out and
motivated.
62What is the form of a non-knowledgeable background self-conception? For reasons iden-
tified by Sarah Paul (2009b), it will not always be a full or partial belief of the form I am
X-ing, since sometimes a person may be doing something intentionally without having any
confidence at all that he or she is succeeding. However, even in these cases the person must
believe that he or she is or may be doing what he or she intends to: that is, in order to be
doing something intentionally a person must at least think there is a chance of success. I
explore these points in more detail in my MS Why We Know What We're Doing.
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guishing the knowledge that perception can play in helping human agents do
the things we mean to be doing, from any role it could be supposed to have in
helping us know whether we are doing those things. Thus she writes:
Normally someone doing or directing anything makes use of his
senses, or of reports given him, the whole time: he will not go on to
the next order, for example, until he knows that the preceding one
has been executed, or, if he is the operator, his senses inform him of
what is going on. This knowledge is of course always `speculative' as
opposed to `practical'. Thus in any operation we really can speak of
two knowledgesthe account that one could give of what one was
doing, without adverting to observation; and the account of exactly
what is happening at a given moment (say) to the material one is
working on. The one is practical, the other speculative. (I, 88-89)
As I noted above, Anscombe's idea is that while human finitude means that,
unlike God, we sometimes have to draw on perceptual knowledge that is taken
from things in order successfully to exercise our agential powers, still the knowl-
edge of what one is doing is always grounded independently of our senses.63 But
there are several problems with what Anscombe says in this passage. One is that
if we follow the Thomistic conception of practical cognition developed above,
it is not clear that an agent's knowledge of what is happening to the material
she is working on is a form of speculative knowledge at all: for this knowledge
concerns something the agent is capable of producing (or otherwise she would
not be working on it); it considers this material as something that is to be made
into a certain form; and it does all this with the aim of bringing a certain thing
about. Second, and to return to a point I made in Section 4.2, in the sort of
case we are considering it does not seem possible to enforce a division between
the knowledge of what one is doing and the knowledge that certain things are
happening in the material world: the agent must know whether those things
63In a similar way, Kevin Falvey suggests that even though perception is sometimes a
necessary condition for agent's knowledge, it does not follow that it is ever the ground of this
knowledge, as its bearing on what an agent knows may be restricted to the kind of role that
perception plays in mathematical proof (see Burge 1993), where even if I make use of my
senses in proving a theorem I do not have to cite these observational judgments as additional
premises on which the conclusion of the proof depends (Falvey 2000, 33). However, while it
is certainly true that perception often plays this kind of role in action, still there seem to be
cases where the role of perception in agent's knowledge is plainly justificatory, as evidenced
by the way perception would be cited in answer to a question of the form How do you
know that you are X-ing (say, replenishing the water supply of the house)?  Because I
can see that I am, the agent might reply, thereby identifying perception as the justificatory
ground of his or her knowledge, and not just something that enables him or her to know this
thing non-empirically. (This is not the place to offer a theory of the epistemological basing
relation, but it seems incontestable that in ordinary circumstances one answers the question
How do you know? by citing (at least part of) what one takes to be one's ground of this
knowledge.) And Falvey himself allows that this is sometimes the case, claiming that when
an agent is operating in a difficult or unfamiliar situation, or has reason to question whether
various background circumstances are cooperating with his intended course of action, a self-
ascription of an intentional doing may stand in need of support from information acquired
through observation (ibid., 36)  which is just to concede the point I am making here.
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are happening not just to do what she means to, but also to know that she is
doing this. (It is only if he knows that water is traveling through the pipe, that
the man at the pump can know that he is replenishing the water supply of the
house.) For this reason, in a case like this perception may serve as an aid to
action just by informing the agent of whether she is or is not acting as he means
to: its guiding role in action is inseparable from its grounding role as a source
of agential knowledge. Yet once again, this sort of perception-based knowledge
of what one is doing can still be a practical way of knowing, since it is ordered
to the end of bringing its object into being.64
Another way some have objected to this position is by arguing that while
perception may be required in order to know what one has achieved, the knowl-
edge of what one is doing does not require this.65 Such is the position of Michael
Thompson, who develops it by revisiting Davidson's carbon-copier case:
. . . the more ordinary case is like this: you write on the top sheet,
trying to make a good impression to get through all the carbon, then
look to see if your impression made it through to all of them. If it
did, you stop. If it didn't, you remove the last properly impressed
sheet and begin again. If necessary, you repeat. Even the man
who has to go through five stages is all along, from the first feeble
impression, making ten copies of the document, and he knows it, all
along. (Thompson 2011, 210)
In Thompson's example, as you make the carbon copies you appeal to perception
in order to know whether you have made them all; and if you see that you have
not, you resume your course of action appropriately. Your knowledge that you
are making ten copies, however, is independent of this. But not all cases fit
this model. For example, the man operating the pump who checks on the levels
of poison in the house water supply may be interested not just in whether he
was replenishing (or has replenished) the supply, but rather in whether he is
presently doing so: if the man finds that the levels of poison are not changing,
then this will be evidence that he is not doing one of the things he means to be
doing, namely replenishing the supply; and by the same token, if he finds that
they are going up, then this will be evidence that he is doing this. Because of
this, it is a mistake to think that perception can inform a person only of her
64Compare McDowell's claim that when practical knowledge has objective happenings as its
object, dann ist es das Wissen, dass Geschehnisse, die man vielleicht spekulativ wissen muss,
um überhaupt etwas von ihnen zu wissen, die Ausführung der eigenen Absicht ist. Von einem
Geschehen zu wissen, dass es die Ausführung der eigenen Absicht ist, ist kein spekulatives
Wissen, selbst dann, wenn man spekulativen Wissens bedarf, um zu wissen, dass das relevant
Geschehen tatsächlich stattfindet (McDowell 2013, 401). However, I don't see the need to
restrict the content of practical knowledge to facts of the form: that such-and-such happenings
are an execution of my intention, where the fact of the happenings is known only speculatively.
Instead, the paradigmatic form of agential knowledge is: that I am doing such-and-such  and
thus there should be no problem in saying that practical knowledge is ever a special Form
von wissen, dass bestimmte Dinge in der objektiven Wirklichkeit geschehen (ibid.). For what
is intentional bodily activity, if not something that happens in objective reality?
65Thanks to Anselm Müller for pressing me to consider this objection.
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past intentional behaviors, and never any present ones.66
Again, however, we also should not think that allowing the possibility that
agent's knowledge may be grounded in perception means giving up on the idea
that it constitutes a distinctively agential form of self-knowledge. Based on
what I have learned from presenting this argument in the past, this is the most
common reason people have for resisting my conclusion: they insist that the
knowledge of what one is doing must be a constituent of intentional activity,
and that the perception of an object or event is always something extra to it,
a way of representing it from the outside.67 But while the first of these claims
seems true, the second rests on a conflation of knowledge that is perceptual
with knowledge that is speculative  and it is exactly this conflation that I
am out to resist.68 As I have emphasized, agential knowledge is distinctively
practical because of its distinctive scope and aim, and the role this knowledge
plays in agential self-guidance: this knowledge is not a mere monitoring of
an independent event, but an integral part of the process by which a person
brings about the very action that it is a representation of. Sometimes, the
best way to do this is by keeping perceptual track of one's actions and their
consequences: and in these cases, what one perceives is not wholly independent
66Another question is whether one needs already to have known that one was in the process
of X-ing in order for the information that one is X-ing to have practical significance. (Thanks
to Will Small and Anselm Müller for pressing this sort of objection.) This is implausible,
though: the only requirement in the vicinity is that one knows what she means to be doing,
so that then she can alter her behavior to bring it in line with her intention.
67One route to this latter conclusion is through Sebastian Rödl's argument that since agen-
tial knowledge is a form of self-consciousness, it must therefore be unmediated, i.e. not resting
on any judgment identifying oneself with the object one knows. And since, the argument
continues, it's in the nature of perception that its object may be something other than one-
self, therefore any perceptually-grounded self-ascription must be mediated by an identifying
judgment, and so not an instance of self-consciousness. (For versions of this argument, see
see Rödl 2007, 7-10, 58-62 and Haddock 2011, 150-152. Thanks to an anonymous referee for
pushing me to address it more explicitly.) This is an important argument that raises too many
complex issues for me to address them all here, but I think the conclusion can be resisted,
by challenging either the premise that all self-conscious knowledge must be identification-
free (see Howell 2007; Lane 2011; Schwenkler 2013), or the assumption that since perception
sometimes takes as its objects things other than oneself, therefore all perceptual knowledge of
oneself must be based on an identifying judgment (see de Vignemont 2012). In addition, it's
important to emphasize that on my account, perceptually grounded agential knowledge is not
wholly receptive, as it would be if it were entirely divorced from one's practical thinking or
from the process of agential self-guidance. In such a case (for an illustration, see Velleman's
example of the absent-minded walker (Velleman 2007a, 15)), a person would have no idea
that she was X-ing, except for the fact that she perceived herself to be  and I agree that
there is an important sense in which this could not be an instance of self-knowledge. But the
position of the finite agent is different from this: her knowledge that she is X-ing is part of her
conception of the means-end order of her activity, and functions as a cause and measure of its
object. Even when it is grounded partly in perception, such knowledge will not be a knowledge
of oneself as other, or of something whose reality is independent of one's knowledge of it.
Again, I admit that there is much more that must be said about these matters, and I take
them up in other work.
68Compare Anton Ford's complaint, that Desinteressierte Wahrnehmung ist die einzige Art
von Wahrnehmung, über die normalerweise in der Philosophie nachgedacht wird (Ford 2013,
412). I say a bit more about the contrast between interested and disinterested perception
in Section 5.
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of one's perceptual knowledge of it, since what one perceives is an action, and
perceptual attentiveness to one's actions is among the mechanisms of agency
itself. Because of this, it is true in a sense that a person will usually know
what she is intentionally doing simply insofar as she is doing it at all, but this
is only because in ordinary circumstances the knowledgeable awareness of what
one is doing is a component of human agency  and it does not follow that this
knowledge is always independent of perception, since perception is often among
the components of agency, too.69 What makes agent's knowledge distinctive is
not its source, but the fact that it relates to its objects differently than would the
speculative or theoretical cognition of an outside observer: it is a practical
way of knowing, a kind of thought that is drawn on in bringing its object into
existence.70
5 Conclusion
I have argued that the representation of what one is intentionally doing is nec-
essarily distinctive, not because it is always a form of non-perceptual knowl-
edge, but because of the role it plays in guiding one's behavior: this practical
self-understanding is an integral component of intentional action; it is a rep-
resentation that causes what it represents. Yet a person's conception of what
she is intentionally doing is not infallible (4.1), and not all true practical self-
conceptions are instances of practical knowledge (4.2), nor is the practical
knowledge of what one is doing always grounded independently of perception
(4.3). In the remainder of this section I will briefly propose a sense in which
 paradoxically as this sounds  the knowledge of what one is intentionally do-
ing might always be a form of non-observational knowledge, even when it is
grounded in perception.
As we have seen, Anscombe appears to assume that all empirical knowledge
is speculative rather than practical, since knowledge that is based in perception
can never be the cause of what it understands. I have argued here that this
assumption is unwarranted: it is possible for the knowledge of what one is doing
to be both grounded in the perception of its object and causally implicated
69For a clear statement of this point, see Gibbons 2010. Similarly, Rödl writes that what
makes the knowledge of one's action a form of first person knowledge is that one's action is
not an independent reality of the first person knowledge of it (Rödl 2007, 62). I agree with
this, but would reject Rödl's implication that this knowledge therefore cannot be sensory
knowledge, for the reasons just explained. I discuss this argument further in Perception and
Self-Consciousness.
70Compare Moran, who writes that we will all agree that a person will need to know what
he is doing if we are to ask him for his reasons in doing it [and thus regard it as intentional],
but why should the particular manner in which he acquires this knowledge matter to its
status as intentional? Why isn't the knowledge itself enough, however it may be arrived
at? And why should the action's status as intentional (under this description) depend on
the agent's awareness of it having this very special basis in particular, viz., a basis that is
independent of observation, evidence, or inference? (Moran 2001, 125-126). He asks these
questions rhetorically, of course: Moran's assumption is that the basis of this knowledge
matters quite a lot. If my argument here has done its work, this assumption will have been
revealed as insufficiently motivated.
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in bringing that object into being, since the perception of what one is doing
is sometimes the ground of the knowledge that is drawn on in keeping one's
intentional behaviors on course. Yet at the same time, our intuitions balk at
any attempt to characterize this agential self-attentiveness as a way of observing
one's actions. What is there to keep the account of practical knowledge that I
offered here from collapsing into this problematic idea?
In order to see a way out, consider Brian O'Shaughnessy's discussion, in
The Will, of what he describes as the inability to stand to [one's own] ac-
tions in the relation of observer (O'Shaughnessy 2008, 318).71 According to
O'Shaughnessy, As I attempt to relate observationally to my own actions, ei-
ther observation seems merely to skid over the surface of the act or else the act
begins to come to a standstill (ibid., 332). In saying this, O'Shaughnessy is
clearly not denying the possibility of perceiving what one is doing, as if inten-
tional activities were invisible to their agents; rather, he claims that to relate
as observer to what one is doing would be not just to perceive it, but for
one's observation to fall outside what one was doing: the act of observation
would neither be subordinated to the act under observation, nor would the act
under observation be subordinated to the act of observation itself (ibid., 338;
italics modified). For O'Shaugnessy, the subordination of action to perception
is what distinguishes the dynamic-perceptual standpoint of the agent from the
receptive-perceptual standpoint of one who observes an agent from the outside
(ibid., 337): perceiving what one is doing is essentially part of the process of
bringing something into being rather than taking in how the world anyway is.
In contrast to the standpoint of the agent, O'Shaughnessy describes the
role of the observer as one of attendant questioner, or one who regards the
object of her perception as something that is going its own way, that is taking
its own course, and that may or may not shed a certain requisite item for
which we are busy scrounging, viz., facts of a particular kind (ibid., 330).
In Aquinas' terminology, this scrounging is a form of speculative intellectual
activity; the knowledge it produces will be a knowledge of things that one does
not regard as the intended products of one's agential powers.72 In contrast
to the practical cognition of the agent, this sort of receptive attitude is aimed
simply at securing a knowledgeable representation of its objects, and plays no
direct role in determining what they are. But the essential point to see is that
more is required to make one an observer of an event in this sense than simply
the fact that one perceives that it is taking place: just as having non-perceptual
knowledge that one is doing something does not suffice for knowing it in a
practical way, so O'Shaughnessy's suggestion seems to be that there is a sense
in which being a perceiver of something does not always make one an observer
71For another discussion of O'Shaughnessy's text, whose conclusion is (I think) consistent
with my own, see Gibbons 2010.
72On the incompatibility of agency with a spectatorial attitude, see the many suggestive
passages cited inVelleman 2007a, xii n.3; and cf. Gibbons 2010; Ford 2013. Richard Creek
has pointed out to me that Wittgenstein also has several things to say in this connection, e.g.
in section 13 of the Brown Book and in Zettel, 583, 586, and 591-592. For some discussion
of these passages, see Scott 1996, 150-151.
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of it, either.
If this is what we take to be at the core of the distinction between obser-
vational and non-observational knowledge, then denying that agent's knowl-
edge is ever knowledge through observation does not require saying that it can
never be perceptually grounded. For the difference between the observational
and non-observational varieties of knowledge is not that the former variety is
perceptually-based while the latter is not, but rather that the standpoint of the
observer is passive and theoretically-oriented, while from the agent's perspective
the world is not simply given as a thing to be known, but rather is something
that she is in the midst of changing.73 Anscombe herself did not consider this
possibility; she never abandons the idea that the non-observational knowledge
of one's actions must be secured independently of sense perception.74 Nor does
she develop as explicitly as I have here the idea that it is in virtue of its role in
agential self-guidance that the knowledge of what one is intentionally doing is
the cause of what it understands. As is so often the case, working out a philoso-
pher's best insights requires us to reject some of her own views, and develop
others in a way that she did not. But it is by following Anscombe in taking
seriously the idea that the knowledge of action is distinctive primarily insofar
as it is practical rather than speculative, that we can see our way out of the
darkness that envelops us when this distinction is kept out of view.
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the construction of a building from afar, without seeing or hearing any reports on its progress
(ibid., 82); to one's ability to know what one is writing even if one's eyes are closed (ibid., 53,
82); to God's knowledge of creation (ibid., 87); and to a list that a shopper carries with him
that directs his purchases, in contrast to a list made by a detective who follows the shopper
around (ibid., 56). Each of these cases is one of knowledge, or at least the representation
of some facts, that is not grounded in any perceptual awareness of the states of affairs in
question: as she puts it, it is not a belief that is verified by the senses, i.e., [that] is a matter
of observation (ibid., 54).
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